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Abstract The shift in the prevailing view of alcoholism from a moral paradigm
towards a biomedical paradigm is often characterized as a form of biomedicaliza-
tion. We will examine and critique three reasons offered for the claim that viewing
alcoholism as a disease is morally problematic. The ﬁrst is that the new concep-
tualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease will lead to individualization,
e.g., a too narrow focus on the individual person, excluding cultural and social
dimensions of alcoholism. The second claim is that biomedicalization will lead to
stigmatization and discrimination for both alcoholics and people who are at risk of
becoming alcoholics. The third claim is that as a result of the biomedical point of
view, the autonomy and responsibility of alcoholics and possibly even persons at
risk may be unjustly restricted. Our conclusion is that the claims against the bio-
medical conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease are neither
speciﬁc nor convincing. Not only do some of these concerns also apply to the
traditional moral model; above that they are not strong enough to justify the
rejection of the new biomedical model altogether. The focus in the scientiﬁc and
public debate should not be on some massive ‘‘biomedicalization objection’’ but on
the various concerns underlying what is framed in terms of the biomedicalization of
alcoholism.
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Introduction
Currently we are witnessing a shift in the prevailing view of alcoholism. Inﬂuenced
by science, the concept of alcoholism is increasingly understood as a chronic brain
disease with a neurobiological and genetic basis [1, 2]. In a recent brochure titled
‘‘Alcoholism: Getting the Facts’’ from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (NIAAA) it is claimed, ‘‘In our society, the myth prevails that an
alcohol problem is a sign of moral weakness’’ [3, p. 3] However, in this brochure it
is also stated, ‘‘In fact, alcoholism is a disease that is no more a sign of weakness
than is asthma’’ [3, p. 3].
The ﬁrst quotation illustrates that in the public mind, alcoholics are still
considered weak-willed persons who have little or no willpower to resist alcohol.
Alcoholics are held morally responsible for their destructive way of life. And they
are morally condemned for not being able to control their compulsion to drink. The
second quotation illustrates the shift towards a biomedical model of alcoholism.
The conceptual shift from the moral paradigm to a biomedical paradigm is often
characterized as a form of biomedicalization [4–7]. The concept of biomedicaliza-
tion is derived from the more traditional concept of medicalization and adds a
biological component to the medical component, thus stressing the signiﬁcance of
molecular biology within the biomedical paradigm. The concept of biomedicaliza-
tion has both descriptive and evaluative connotations. Sometimes it is used to
describe a process in which different aspects of life are increasingly brought under
the guidance of biomedicine [8]. More often the term has an evaluative meaning and
refers to a process with predominantly negative implications [9, 10].
In this article, we examine the ‘‘biomedicalization objection’’ and focus on three
important concerns underlying the claim that the biomedicalization of alcoholism
has serious drawbacks. The ﬁrst concern is that the new conceptualization of
alcoholism as a chronic brain disease will lead to individualization, ignoring other
dimensions of the phenomenon [6, 11, 12]. The second concern is that
biomedicalization will lead to stigmatization and discrimination for both alcoholics
and people who are at risk of becoming alcoholics [13]. When we use the term
‘‘alcoholics’’ it refers to both problem drinkers and alcohol addicts. We are aware
that the term ‘‘alcoholics’’ can have negative connotations (‘‘alcoholics are people
who can’t control themselves’’). For the sake of practicality, however, we will use
this term, although in a neutral and descriptive manner. The third concern is that as a
result of the biomedical point of view, the autonomy and responsibility of alcoholics
and possibly even persons at risk may be unjustly restricted [14, 15]. These three
concerns will be critically evaluated. Our conclusion is that the claims against the
biomedical conceptualization of alcoholism as a chronic brain disease are neither
speciﬁc nor convincing. Not only do some of these concerns also apply to the
traditional moral model; beyond that, they are not strong enough to justify the
rejection of the new biomedical model altogether.
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It is sometimes argued that conceptualizing alcoholism as a chronic brain disease
with a genetic component reduces alcoholism to a problem (a disease), which is
primarily or exclusively located at the level of the individual [6]. When seeing
alcoholism as a brain disease, the focus will be on neurobiological and genetic
strategies for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of alcoholism. Little or no
attention then goes to the contribution of the social environment (parents, family,
friends, peers, community, society) to the problem of alcoholism [6]. Possible social
co-determinants of alcoholism such as poverty, social inequality, and easy
availability of alcoholic beverages disappear from sight [12]. Cultural dimensions
of alcohol use, alcohol-related problems, and alcoholism are excluded.
Here two claims can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is the presumption that conceptu-
alizing alcoholism as a chronic brain disease presupposes an interpretation of
alcoholism exclusively in biomedical terms [6, p. 2]. An example is the
understanding of alcoholism as a brain dysfunction only. The second claim is that
this neuro-biological reductionism has adverse effects. In particular, in preventive
medicine the emphasis may be put on individual genetic risk factors inﬂuencing the
susceptibility for alcoholism instead of social factors such as poverty or the easy
availability of alcohol.
How should we evaluate these claims? Concerning the ﬁrst claim, it could be
questioned whether seeing alcoholism as a brain disease necessarily presupposes
biological reductionism. The claim that alcoholism is a brain disease is usually
made in the context of the so-called biopsychosocial model, which maintains that
(alcohol) addiction is a multidimensional phenomenon in which biological, genetic,
psychological, and social components operate together [16]. As Leshner empha-
sizes, ‘‘Addiction is not just a brain disease. It is a brain disease for which the social
contexts in which it has both developed and is expressed are critically important’’
[2, p. 46]. Considering the implications of this view, Leshner claims that treatment
strategies should include biological, behavioral, and social-context elements: ‘‘Not
only must the underlying brain disease be treated, but the behavioral and social cue
components must also be addressed, just as they are with many other brain diseases,
including stroke, schizophrenia, and Alzheimer’s disease’’ [2, p. 46].
It might be argued that although the biospychosocial model is the dominant
approach to addiction, until now it has had relatively little impact on how medicine is
practiced today [6]. This, however, does not necessarily disqualify the biopsycho-
social model, as there always is the problem of translation and implementation.
Obviously it is false that biomedical models necessarily entail biological reduction-
ism. The lesser but more realistic claim can be made that at least some of the
proponents of biomedical approaches simply pay lip service to the biopsychosocial
model. This claim implies that the proponents suggest that they are aware of the
complexities and multifaceted nature of alcoholism—as the abovementioned
Leshner does—but in reality nevertheless take recourse to a reductionist, unicausal
biological approach. The lip service claim surely deserves closer examination, and,
as a matter of fact, people who invoke psychosocial and integrative models not
infrequently pay lip service to them. We should be aware, however, that people who
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service to this model.
More important is the second, empirical claim concerning possible adverse
effects on (preventive) medicine. The main concern is that prevention and treatment
of alcoholism is predominantly aimed at the individual, and not at the individual’s
environment and social circumstances. Concentrating exclusively on genetics and
neurobiology could encourage the idea that alcoholism is primarily an individual
health problem that can be traced to defects in the individual’s genetic and
neurobiological make up. The rise of neuroscience and genetics may be both an
expression and a catalyst of this development [6]. Consequently, in prevention, the
focus may be on individual genetic risk factors inﬂuencing the susceptibility for
alcoholism instead of social factors such as the availability of alcohol or poverty.
The broader ‘‘culture of alcohol’’ in which alcohol consumption is taken for granted
or even promoted remains out of sight. And in treatment the focus may be on
individual pharmacological treatment instead of family or group oriented interven-
tions (behavioral, psychotherapeutic, self help, mutual help, etc.), or a combination
of these interventions. Alcoholics could be led to believe that there is a pill for every
ill [17].
Individualization, whether it is a result of a biomedical approach to alcoholism or
not, is one-sided and reductionist, and thus cannot be justiﬁed. However, the claim
that a biomedical approach is likely to lead to individualization is not self-evident.
Neither is it clear beforehand that individualization is exclusively attached to the
biomedical paradigm, and not to other approaches. On the contrary: the traditional
moral view seems to be inherently individual. In and of itself, a biomedical approach
towards alcoholism does not need to deny that non-biomedical factors play a
(signiﬁcant) role in the causation and possible treatment and management of
alcoholism, unless it is claimed that only biomedical factors play a role, which
beyond that are considered to be relevant only at the level of the individual person. If
the biomedical approach is integrated in a biopsychosocial perspective, then it is
possible to identify biological, personal, and social factors and learning experiences.
Such an approach may show how these social factors and experiences may have
immediate or more distant inﬂuences on a person’s disposition to use alcohol. It also
shows that social and individual factors can be inﬂuenced by the consequences of
alcohol use. Because research shows that (excessive) alcohol consumption causes
neurobiological damage to the developing brain, and because of the existence of
genetic susceptibilities, it is considered important by biomedical researchers that
social interventions aimed at the reduction of alcohol consumption are implemented.
Stigmatization and discrimination
The second concern is that the new biomedical paradigm of alcoholism will lead to
stigmatization and discrimination of both alcoholics and those who are genetically
predisposed. The view that alcoholism is a chronic brain disease suggests that the
adverse changes in the brain resulting from alcohol use may be permanent. This
view can have implications for the way in which alcoholics are perceived: ‘‘Once an
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the genetic component. The combination of (presumed) incurability and genetic
susceptibility could also stigmatize blood-relatives of alcoholics (especially
children) whose risk to become alcoholics themselves may be overestimated when
combined with the common lay wisdom that ‘‘alcoholism runs in families.’’ Beyond
that, so it is argued, the conceptualization of alcoholism as a genetic brain disease
could result in a speciﬁc form of stigmatization, i.e. victim blaming. The growing
knowledge about genetic susceptibility to alcoholism may lead to a practice in
which people increasingly will be held responsible for the adverse consequences of
their addiction (trafﬁc accidents, domestic violence, harm to health).
There may be a close relation between stigmatization and discrimination [18].
Stigmatization may lead to discrimination—for instance, when alcoholics are
unjustly excluded from insurance. Persons with a genetic predisposition to
alcoholism may be discriminated against on the basis of the false deterministic
belief that ‘‘having the predisposition is equal to having the disease.’’ Imagine the
hypothetical case of a bus driver with an impeccable record of duty who is ﬁred
because a test has indicated a predisposition for alcoholism [13]. How should the
stigmatization and discrimination claims be evaluated?
Some authors deny that the conceptualization of alcoholism as a brain disease
results in stigmatization and discrimination [2]. They argue that the transition to a
more biomedical approach of alcoholics results in the destigmatization and
deculpabilization of alcohol addicts. If alcoholics are seen as people who are ill,
they no longer will be condemned as morally weak persons [2, 19, 20]. These
authors resist the traditional view that alcoholism is primarily a mental and moral
problem. According to this moral view (which still has contemporary defenders),
alcoholics should feel guilty and be ashamed for not being able to resist the call of
alcohol [21]. Proponents of a biomedical approach, however, believe that alcoholics
should not be seen as morally bad persons. Destigmatization, it is argued, will have
positive effects, such as opening the door for a more enlightened health policy that
is less punitive and more caring towards alcoholics [19]. Furthermore, it may
increase access to medical treatments [22] and provide new opportunities for
alcoholics to participate more fully and equally in society. Alcoholics may have a
stronger motivation to make use of health care services in order to be treated,
because possible obstacles like feelings of guilt or shame may be reduced. Finally,
destigmatization might contribute to less social isolation.
What the implications of the biomedical paradigm for issues of (de)stigmatiza-
tion, discrimination and (de)culpabilization will be is an empirical question that
cannot yet be answered. Already, some empirical research on these issues is being
conducted, particularly examining the views of ordinary people regarding moral
attribution and the exoneration of actors for undesirable behaviors [23, 24]. Studies
of folk intuitions suggest that when the causes of an action are described in
neurological terms, they are not found any more exculpatory than when described in
psychological terms [24]. This would suggest that biomedicalization will not
necessarily lead to deculpabilization.
Concerns about discrimination and stigmatization cannot be wholly dismissed
[25]. It is conceivable that ‘‘biomedical’’ stigmatization strengthens the already
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excuse the person from making responsible decisions. Above that, medical and
genetic judgments may replace the stigmatization that is based on moral
condemnation. If alcoholics are seen as suffering from an incurable, chronic
disease, they may be stigmatized and discriminated against by employers. At the
same time, people with a genetic risk for alcoholism may be discriminated against.
Obviously, these issues are part of the general debate about adequate protections for
access to employment and insurance for patients as well as for people carrying
genetic susceptibilities for disease.
It seems critically important to ﬁght genetic determinism and to raise public
awareness about the fact that genetic susceptibilities for alcoholism have a relatively
low penetrance compared to risk factors for traditional Mendelean disorders like
Huntington’s disease: many people genetically ‘‘at risk’’ will never become
alcoholics. Such public awareness may well lessen the risk of stigmatization and
discrimination of people with a genetic risk for alcoholism.
Limitation of liberties
The third concern related to the biomedical conceptualization of alcoholism as a
genetic brain disease is that it will threaten the individual autonomy of alcoholics;
in particular, that the use of pressure and coercive treatment towards them will
increase [14]. Both the use of pressure and coercion are liberty-limiting measures
[26]. By pressure we refer to different kinds of interactions aimed at inﬂuencing
the behavior of alcoholics like the use of inducements and threats. Although such
pressures may aim at the enhancement of a person’s future liberty and autonomy,
at the same time they are actually liberty-limiting. Coercion involves the use of
interventions by which alcoholics may be compelled to take treatment against
their will by detention in a hospital and, if necessary, by the use of physical force
[27].
This concern does not necessarily imply that all critics of biomedicalization view
any limitation of the freedom of alcoholics as morally problematic in the same way
that Thomas Szasz views any involuntary treatment of patients with mental illness
as morally unjustiﬁed [28]. What critics do fear is that the biomedicalization of
alcoholism will make the use of pressure and coercion towards alcoholics
increasingly likely and socially acceptable. Since individual liberty and personal
autonomy are central goods in modern Western societies, there is a moral
presumption against liberty-limiting measures [29, 30]. This implies that the use of
pressure and coercion needs moral justiﬁcation.
There are two aspects to this issue. Firstly, there is the empirical question
whether it is probable that more pressure and coercion towards alcoholics will
actually appear. And secondly, there is the normative question whether the use of
pressure and coercion in treatment should be considered as necessarily morally
wrong and unjustiﬁed.
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Some believe that the use of pressure and coercion will be likely to increase [15].
Two considerations underlie this belief. The ﬁrst is that neurobiological insights
suggest that long-term abuse of alcohol causes adverse changes in the human brain
(neuroadaptation). Often the metaphor of the ‘‘hijacked brain’’ is applied: the
hijackers (alcohol) are taking over control and determine behavior [22]. The addict
is subjected to factors that are beyond his control. Some argue that the
neurobiological perspective implies that the autonomy and decision making
capacities of the severely, long-term alcohol addicted person is undermined. This
viewpoint would justify more pressure and coercion towards alcoholics for their
best interest. Such paternalistic pressure and coercion aims at helping the alcoholic
to regain control over his own actions [31]. The second consideration involves the
prospect of better and more effective treatments for alcoholism. Assuming that in
the short term better treatments (more effective and more speciﬁc) will become
available, it is argued that it is in the best interest of addicted individuals that
treatment takes place [15]. This raises the question whether alcoholics remain free
to choose whether or not to undergo effective treatment [14].
There is ongoing debate about coercive treatment of unwilling (alcohol) addicts
[32]. Part of the moral justiﬁcation of coercive treatment is the effectiveness of
interventions [33]. Should alcoholics be coerced to take part in treatment programs
in order to prevent harm to self and others [34]? To the extent that medical
treatments are effective and can be safely used, the question of freedom of choice of
the addicted person becomes increasingly relevant, particularly if the patient refuses
treatment.
It is hard to predict whether pressure and coercion will increase as a result of the
biomedical paradigm as compared to the traditional moral model. Anyway, it
appears that both the moral foundation and the type of coercive interventions may
be different. In the traditional model, moral condemnation by the community was
the basis for intervening primarily in a punitive way. On the basis of the biomedical
model, claims are based on scientiﬁc arguments, either in regard to defects in the
autonomy of the addicted individual, or with reference to better treatments. Moral
condemnation often worked in subtle and informal ways—for instance through
social pressure in the community. In the biomedical model, coerced treatment will
be embedded in a formal and legal system in which an ‘‘objective’’ medical
judgment plays an important role.
The conclusion is that it remains to be seen whether a biomedical approach will
lead to more pressure or coercion towards alcoholics. It is probable that the type of
coercive interventions will change because of the different underlying motives and
justiﬁcations. In a disease model, coercive therapeutic interventions may replace
more punitive interventions that are connected to traditional models based on moral
badness. Clearly, seeing alcoholism as a chronic brain disease does raise further
normative questions concerning autonomy and responsibility.
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The second, normative issue is how the use of pressure and coercion must be
evaluated from a moral point of view. Is it necessarily a bad thing if the freedom of
alcoholics is restrained? The concern regarding a possible increase of the use of
pressure and coercion toward alcohol addicts is based on the presumed wrongness
of liberty-limiting measures. However, here a distinction is necessary between
justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed use of pressure and coercion.
There are two main moral arguments to justify coercion in this case. The ﬁrst is
the prevention of harm to others that may not be criminally liable, for instance in
cases of domestic violence. The second is the prevention of harm to self, for
instance in case of alcoholics who completely neglect their own well being. An
exact analysis of how these principles, the harm principle and the principle of
paternalism, should be applied is beyond the scope of this paper (see [33]). Elements
involve notions of effectiveness of interventions, proportionality (i.e., reasonable
relationship between goal and means), subsidiarity (i.e., least restrictive alternative),
unintended consequences, decision-making capacity, and the magnitude and
seriousness of the harms to be prevented.
The question is whether it is always right to hold on to the principle of respect for
autonomy in the provision of care and treatment. In less serious cases of alcohol
addiction, it is argued that pressure into treatment is justiﬁed not only to prevent
harms to health, but also in order to prevent a possible future loss of autonomy. In
the case of severely deprived and long-term addicted persons, a coerced treatment
aimed at the promotion of the well-being of the person may seem more appropriate
than an approach that primarily respects the individual’s autonomy.
A sound analysis should make a distinction between different cases of alcohol
addiction. Firstly, severe cases which generally will involve not only problems with
drinking alcohol, but also other mental and physical illnesses and disorders
(comorbidity). In these cases defects of decision-making capacity may be involved
[35–37], and coercive treatment may be indicated in order both to improve the
health and quality of life of the alcoholic and to help him or her to gradually regain
some control over his or her life and autonomy. In this case, one can argue that
although the intervention is paternalistic, it is a justiﬁed form of weak paternalism.
Weak paternalism (as distinguished from strong paternalism) occurs when a person
whose decision-making capacity is impaired (at least with respect to alcohol) is
forced to undergo treatment in his best interest. Insofar a biomedical approach
implies that there is more room for coercion in these particular cases, then there is
no morally convincing reason to oppose the use of coercion.
Secondly, there are cases of alcoholism and alcohol abuse in which the decision-
making capacity with respect to alcohol will generally not be impaired. Forcing the
alcoholic to be treated might in that case constitute a form of strong paternalism.
According to strong paternalism, the state is justiﬁed in protecting a person, against
his will, from the harmful consequences even of his fully voluntary choices and
undertakings [38]. In liberal societies, it is harder to justify strong versions of
paternalism than weak versions. If a biomedical approach would imply forms of
strong paternalism, this would be ethically problematic.
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The shifting conceptualization of alcoholism in terms of a chronic brain disease
with a genetic component is sometimes characterized as a symptom of biomed-
icalization in the evaluative and negative sense of this concept. After having
scrutinized three of the main concerns, we conclude that these concerns are neither
speciﬁc to the biomedical model nor immediately convincing. Firstly, it is not self-
evident that the social context of alcoholism will be completely ignored as long as
the brain disease view on alcoholism is embedded in an integrated biopsychosocial
approach. The challenge is to develop a rich biopsychosocial model that does justice
to the complexities of this approach, thereby preventing biological (or genetic)
reductionism ‘‘in disguise.’’ Secondly, it remains to be seen whether stigmatization
and discrimination will necessarily increase, though it may be that their basis and
character change as a result of new scientiﬁc insights. Thirdly, even though the use
of pressure towards or coerced treatment of alcoholics may be facilitated by a brain
disease model, in some of the severe cases of alcoholism this may be in the best
interest of the alcoholic and ought not to be evaluated negatively.
There is good reason to suspect that a shift in the prevailing view of alcoholism
will have some positive implications for alcoholics, both with respect to better
prevention and treatment and to how alcoholics are generally viewed. We conclude
that the focus in the scientiﬁc and public debate should not be on some massive
‘‘biomedicalization objection’’ but on the various concerns underlying what is
framed in terms of the biomedicalization of alcoholism. We agree with Nikolas
Rose that ‘‘the term medicalization might be the starting point of an analysis, a sign
of the need for an analysis, but it should not be the conclusion of an analysis’’ [39,p .
702].
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